Michigan Law Review
Volume 17

Issue 4

1919

Food and Fuel Control
William Barker Marvin

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William B. Marvin, Food and Fuel Control, 17 MICH. L. REV. 310 (1919).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol17/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

FOOD AND FUEL CONTROL
THE present war, nationalization of industry and centralizaI N before
tion of control have been .found necessary to an extent never
attempted. The very vastness of the armies, and of the
quantities of munitions and other supplies needed to keep the
strength of the armies at its highest point required that the most
efficient forms of industrial organization be sought out and utilized.
In a nation with a single aim and a single will, that is, in a nation
so organized as to wage successfully a modem war; the individual
has had to sacrifice much for the good of the whole; and the individualistic competitive system has 'had to give way whenever found
.hostile to the best interests of the nation and· of the "cause." ·
It is a trite saying that" "an army. fights on its stomach'', but is
that all? President Wilson has said that "we must .all speak, act,
and serve together"; and the President is unquestionably right. We
have been,-each combatant nation has been,-a nation' in arms.
\Ve have had to keep not only the army well fed, but the multitude
of those "men behind the men behind the guns" upon whom an army
d~nds. A soldier cannot fight well if he is. emadated; neither can
an industrial worker do his best when he and his dependents face
famine. Nor is it ourselves alone that we must look after. If so,
we could divert from exportation a portion of those vast quantities
of food which we send annually to Europe and so have plenty. The
nations of Europe depend upon us. Not one neutral or belligerent
n~tion of western Europe is self-supporting in matters of ·food in
time of peace ; and long since the farms of 04r allies have been deprived of multitudes of men. We have needed to send to them an
increasing quantity of food. And t!J do this we have found that we
must not only produce more than in peace times, but we must
use less, must eliminate waste, and must bring into use the best and
mos~ equitable means of distribution. This is the problem that confronted our government from the very beginning of the war. How
was it met?
·
We had before us the experiences of the other belligerents, more
particularly of England and Germany. Their problems 'varied somewh;lt from ours for with them the danger had long since beco_rne
acute. Germany was cut off from .her usual supplies from outside;·
England was threatened with a ship shortage. But both England
and Germany WC;re ~low in attacking this probl~m. Germany for the
· first year was in no 9anger of famine; England's commerce was
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little impeded. And besides, the problem was of slower development, for in both countries extensive consumers' co-operative societies tlourished, which restrained the greedy disciples of free compctition;1 It is estimated that England's centralized co-operative
organization had three million members in 1914, and it had vast supplies on hand or ·ordered. It refused to take advantage of the popular necessity. In Germany, where co-operation embraced an even
larger percentage of the population: a similar check on corporate
and individual greediness was evident, without government interference. These means prevented panicky prices; but they did not
·necessanly decrease consumption. So, when the respective governments found the food supply running short they were forced to take
official action, in order to limit the individual consumption. Ger- ·
many by May, 1916, had a food dictator.1 England assumed control at first by giving wide powers to the Board of-Tradc.1 Later,
in December, 19161 she f9und a "dictator" necessary.•·
They had delayed longer than was expedient the actual taking of
controL The United States intended to profit by their experience.
We had no consumers' co-operative societies on any scale! They
had been tried at various times and because of insufficient capital,
lack of interest, and at times ruthless underselling they had never
become an important factor in our retail system. Thus we lacked
even this one check on the application of the "supply and demand"
theory. And the need of action was felt to be immediate. National
control was advocated.
Then there was a fuel problem: Coal, next to food, is the most
essential regular necessity of life. Shipping, railway traffic, industry, the home,-all must be supplied regularly. and continually.
Increased industry, increased shipping, vast encampments,---Qll neCt:SSitated more coal; and there were less producers. ·
When it became evident that war was inevitable, a propagan~
for increased production was at once. instituted. Congress aided,
by increased appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for
use in extending county farm agent work and for providing seeds,
where need was evident.• The' propaganda was under the general
direction of Mr. Herbert. Hoover, who had attained world-wide
:I.Article in Annala of American Academy, Nn. 15117, hr Peter Bamiltou.
'New York Times Kay 28, 15116. 1; u, a.
•New York Times NOY. 18, 15116•. 3; 4t 8.
•New York Times Dec. 5, 15116. 2; :r.
•See 1.
• Extra Iarse item in apec:ial appropriation ltill.
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fame by bis management of the distnoution of supplies for the Belgian Relief ~mmission.
.
When Congress met in April, 1917, and declared war, it was of
course necessary to provide at once for the raising, maintenance,
and equipment of an army, and for a greater navy. The appropriate
conscription, revenue, and other army Icgislati~n having been enacted, Congress very naturally proceeded to the very vital problem of
food, and fuel legislation.
·
There was already on the Qc>oks one very useful law as fa~ as
production is concerned. for long ~fore our own entrance into the
War the. Allied competition in our food markets had stirred the
government to the enactment c;>f a law calculated to increase production. Thii; was the noted Federal Fann Loan Act of July 17, 1916.'
Its pilrpose was "to provide capital for agricultural development
to equalize. farm loans," and so forth. A Federal Fann I.oan Board
was authorized by _the act for its enforcement. Twelve Federal
Land Banks were.to be established to do the banking for the board.
Prospective borrowers were to
.,National Farm Loan Associations." These associations were to endorse jointly farm mortgages for individual members, which mortgage woulri be accepted
by the Fann Loan Banks as security for loans. In substance the law
proyides an elaborate organization for freeing the farmer,-t-specially the Western fanner,-from the tyranny of the Eastern money
market. The success of this plan became evident at once; and in the
~er of 1917, as the plan became familiar to the farmers. its
adoption became widespread. In August, 1917, the Federal l<~arn1
Loan Board WllS able to report that eight hundred Farm Loan Associations had been chartered in two and one-half months, and that
loans were being made at the rate of $1,000,000 daily.•
This law together with the p~paganda carried on under the direction of Mr; Hoover and of the DeP,artment of Agriculture was
f clt to sufficiently stimulate production. Only in the l'ase of wheat
was a real shortage feared, and this possible shortage was ascribable to the relul'tance of the-Western farmers to risk overproduction
and consequent lower prices. To stimulate wheat production a guaranteed price was considered necessary, and to regulate distribution
drastic lav,:s were clearly indispensable.
The first law to rt-gufate distribution was enacted under the power
of Congress tp regulate foreign co~merce. This law, enacted June

form

. 'Chap. 245, P. 346. United States Statutea 15116.
•Official Bulletin Au_s. 11, 15117.
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15, 1917, made it a penal offense to e."CpOrt from the country any
artkle which might be named.by the President .in any proclamation
issued at his discretion, to any cciuntry named in the san1e proclamation in that connection, "except at such. time, or times, and under
such _regulations and orders, and subject to such limitations cµid exceptions as the President s~ prescribe, until otherwise ordered by
the President, or by Congress."' This was intended tO preserve our
own supplies of food and war materials (a) by cutting off completely supplies to· ~rmany by way of her too· lenient neighbors, and
(b) by lim~ting exports generally. The C9nstitutionalify of this
law; based as it was upon precedents extending baclc alniost to th~
foundation of the Union, has not been seriously questioned.
The first pr~clamation under authority. of ·this act was issued
July 9.1 @ '"Wliereas the public safety requires that suceor shall be
pr~veµted from r:eaching the enemy," fuel, grain and grain product:;,
f cidder, ~d meats along wi~ certain war materials were not to be
exported excep~ under rCguhitions to be prescn"bcd by the .President;
The ii.des laid down by the President are administered by the Secretarv of Commerce. Thus it can be seen that· \Vhile ·the powers.
_granted by the ad: were "practically complete in regard "to all articles"
of commerce, tli~ prime purpose of th~ act wa:s the ·limitation of
exports of food, fuel, and munitions.
·
.
By further proclamation of August 27, 1917, all e.'Cp()rtations of
war materials, clothing mat~, fuel, and foodstuffs to European
neuti:als were prohibited.11 Moreover in substance the proclamaticn
laid down the general rule that no article, useful ·in war, should tie
exported to
country excr.pt under regulations to be prescribed
by the President, or by the Exports Administratiye Board, which ~s
empowered to administer the act. By a third proclamation the.list
of proscribed articles was· still further increased.ts . .
.
•
To ~mplete the President's· tontrOl over f9reign commerce an
act was passed on October 6, 1917, the essential paragraph of which;
-:-in this connection,-is as follows:
·

a

any

'"Whenever during the present war the President ~ find
that the public safety so requires and shall make.proclamation
thereof, it shnll be unlawful to import into the United Stat~
from any country named in such proclamati~ any article or
articles mentioned in sttch proclamation excep_t.at· suclt time
• Clilp. 30 Title VII, Sec. I, P.
w Pqe 39 Proclamatione 1917.

u

1'ace 47 Proclamatione 1917.

:u 1'ace so Proclamations 1917.

as. Ualted S&atel Statuta 19i7•.

314.

JllCHJG.t!N UW REVIEW

or times, and under such regu]ations or orders, and subject to
such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress."ta
.
Acting under authority of this law the· President on November
28 issued a proclamation, naming an extensive list of war materials,
f oodstutis, lmcuries, ores, et cetera which were not to be imported
except according to regulations issued by the Prcsident.16 The War
Trade Board ~s to administer the regulations.
These however were minor laws, the relation of which to the
problem at hand was more or less incidental. The main question of
"Food Control" had to be dealt with expeditiously and squarely.
The expediency of such ·an act was doubted by few other than s:hose
wh9se interei:ts lay in the direction of unrestrained price-raising in
accordance with the economic laws of free competition. Thus a
Food Control law was demanded by the newspapers of the country,
by platform speakers, and by innumerable petitions to Cvngress.15
It was seen by intelligent men that, at anywhere near normal prices,
"f1..•r every important commodity the demand exceeds the supply.
For coal tht- demand exceeds the capacity for delivery. For steel
the demand is far beyond the capacity of all miJls."'" This e.~cess
demand, averaging twenty per cent had increased prices in many
instances since 1914. ·by one hundred t.o four hundred per cent
With labor decreasing, demand was increasing! All the great packing houses were earning multiples of their normal profits. Appeals
to coroorations on patriotic grounds were entirelv without fntit.
On June 19, 1917, Mr. Hoover declared before the Senate Committee on Agriculture that $250,000,000 execs~ had been collected by
middlemen and millers on flour alone in five months~1T· For such reasons the belief predominated that government regulation of some
kind was vitaliy necessary.
A food bill was introduced into the House on May 4. 1917, by
Representative Lever, Chairman of the Committee on Agriculture.ta
.Owing to the stress of army and finance legislation, it was temporarily side-tracked but the Committee busied itself with the framing
of a comprehensh=e bill._. This was introduced into the House on
.. Chap. 1o6; sec.· n P. 423 United States Statutes 1911
St Proclamation No. 1,11.
•Note Editorialalhy 15 to Aue. 15.
•Van Hise in Annala of American Academy, ·New. 1917.
21' All data from Van Hise in Annala of American Academy. Ncw. 1917.
:ia New York Times, Hay 5.
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June 18, 1917, by Representative Lever. In introducing the bill he
said among other things:·
"It is our duty to see that those for whom he (the farmer)
toils shall not be gouged and robbed by heartless and unpatriotic intermediaries; it is our duty to see that the results of
his patriotic efforts shall not be made the foot-ball of the
gambler, the manip~or, the hoarder, the unconscionable
food speculator and cormorant.-We intend to dri\"e from the
established agencies of distribution the market gambler-the
Shylock of Commerce.'>i•
He further asserted that multitudes of honest men dealing in
foods had asked for some such legislation as a protection so that
they might not be compelled to ~rt to similar methods in order
to keep up the fight. so lfurther evidence of this purpose appears in
the remarks of Senators Nelson and Knox and Representative Caraway, who were among the most active adv~tes of the bill Senator Nelson said:"[This legislation] has a two-fold purpose, Mr President.
One purpose is to provide an ample supply of food and f Ul'l
for our own people and for our allies. The next is,-and
t~t iit perhaps the most difficult and most important problem-to prevent undue extortion al;D<>Dg our own people.''21
Senator Knox said:"By a food-control law the American people are to be protected against the dissipation, in inadequacy of production,
in wasteful methods of dealing and marketing, in thoughtless extravagant consumption, of those things which are the
basic necessity in all we may do for the winning of the war,
as welt as for our.national life itself, namely, food.'tt•
Finally as said by Representative Caraway:"Some one must c:Ontrol ·these conditions in time of war,
and I would infinitely rather that it should be [the President]
* • "' than some gamb'er on a board of trade. I would rather
risk him who by my vote and ·yours is President of the
• Coapadonal
• Co~nal
•Coner-tow
• Conar-Ional

Record, Pqe 4105•
Record, Pqe 41o6.
Record, Pase 4661,
Record, Pqe 4667.
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greatest Republic beneath the sun thaii someone. who· seeks
to coin into gold the tears of starving babes and the withered
hands of unrequited toil.".u
The legislation as proposed made limited. price-fixing possible; ·it
made the control by the President of the distribution of food and
fuel practically absolute; it provided for the fixing of a minimum
price for wheat; and it provided generally for an administative organ. Because of the hostility of special interest$ which, while claiming to favor the general principle of government control, still opposed
its application to their particular cases, prolonged debate ensued.
Especially did· this debate center around the prohibition question.
Innumerable petitions for prohibition as a war measure flowed into
Washington, and the representatives of prohibition state$ made a
strong effort to inc;lude provisos in that connection." Thus the bill
was delayed over month, and when this point was settled, a movement was begun in the Senate to- include an amendment providing
for a joint committee of Congress to supervise war expenditures.-N
It took two more weeks to debate and discard this rider.
The attack on tJie bill wa.S both partisan and personal. Republicans claimed to see in it
unconstitutional delegation of. power to
the President-and at that of a dangerously autocratic power; Democrats like Senator Reed found occasion to attack Mr. Hoover."
Still others asserted that pricC:fixing had everywhere failed; that
government control would ruin business; that the classifit;ltion of
dealers was very arbitrary; aild so forth. And a few actually opposec;l the proposed measures in their progress because they claimed
that they did not go far enough. Finally on August 1oth, the legislation was passed, and approved by the ·President in the form of
two bills.
·
The first was an act for the purpose of "gathering authoritative
information conceming the food supply, increasing production, preventing waste 9f food supply,· regulating the distribution thereof,"
and so forth.n The important provisions· of the
were:-

a

an

act

"The -Secretary of Agriculture, With the approval 0£ the
}>_resident. is authorized to µivestigate and ·ascertain the demand for, the supply, consumption, costs~ and prices of, and
• Co~onal :Record, Pqe .P3P.
..
• Coqraaional ltecord-<June 1-30--At tlie · be,inniq of the record for tl&e day in
botla Bouse and Senate.
• Coqreuional Record, Pace 590a.
• Coqreuional Record, Pqe 38tJ·!f.
• Chap. sa Pp. 373 United States Statutes 11u7.
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the basic facts relating to the ownership,. production, ~
portation, [etc. of foods,] feeds, seeds, fertilizers, agricultural
implements and machinery, and any article required in connection with the production, distribution, or utilization of
food. It shall "be the duty of any person, when requested by
the Secretary· of Agriculture • * • (or his agent) • • • to answer correctly * * * under oath or otherwise * * "' or to produce all papers * * *'JU
A penalty is affi.'lted. The Secretary ~y provide for the appropriate
distribution of seeds.11 Co-operation with state agencies and within
the Federal Government in.uthorized.80 As can readily be seen the
essentials of this bill are concerned with the investigation of the
food supply conditions of the c:Ountry and the stimulation of production. It is in reality only an extension of the activities of the
Department of Agriculture along familiar lines.
The second and principal law was "An act to proYide further for
~e national security and defense by encouraging the production,
conserving the supply, and controlling the distribution of food products and fuel."u The important ~ of this act may be summarb:ed as follows:"Sec. I. * * * it is essential• * * to secure an adequate supply and equitable distn"bution, and to facilitate the moyeinent~ of foods, feeds, fuel * • • (etc.) ; to prevent, locally and
generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious ;;peculation, manipulations, and private controls, affecting such
supplies, distribution, and movement; and to establish and
maintain governmental control of such necessaries during the.
war."
"Sec. It '!'hat in carrying out the purposes of ·this Act
the President is authorized to enter into any voluntary ar. rangements or agreementS, to ~te and i:se any agency or
agencies (etc.)."
·
~·sec. IV. That it is hereby made unlawful for any person willfully· to destroy, • * * to commit waste or willfully to
permit preventable deterioration, * * * to hoard, ** *to monopc>lize, * • * to conspire, combine; agree, or arrange (to do
any of the above things wit1l) necessaries ; (etc.)."
•IWd.
• Ibid Sec. J.
• J1Kcl Sec:a. 4-6. .
• Cbp. 53 Pp. ~ t1c1tecl Stales Statutes 1t11.
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. "Sec. V. The President (may at pleasure) license the
importation, storage, mining, or distribution of any necessaries,. in order to carry into effect any of the purposes of ·this
Act."
.
"Sec. XII. The President* * * is authorized to requi~ition
and take over, for use or operation by the Government, any
factory, packing house, oil pipe line, mine, or any part thereof * * * and to operate the same."
"Sec. XIV. (He shall fix a) guaranteed price for each of
the official grain standards for wheat * * * ."
"Sec. XXV. That the President * * * is hereby authorized
to fi..'C the price of coal and coke, 'wherever and whenever sold,
either by producer or dealer, to establish rules for the regulation of and to regulate the method of production, sale, shipment, distribution api>ortionment, or storage thereof among
dealers and consumers, domestic or foreign."
The rest of the act, freed from its verbiage, provides penalties
for failure to observe the restricting.clauses; for the purchase, distribution and sale of wheat, flour, beans and potatoes at the discretion of the President; for the regulation of Exchanges and boards
of trade; for the limitation of the use of foodstuffs in the manufacture -0f distilled spirits; appropriations for carrying out the law ;
for an agency to control the production, sale, purchases, and so
forth of coal; for the sale of all coal and coke to the United States
and its resale by the government, if the President wish~; for tpe
fixing of maximum prices for fuel.12
·
The· very stringency of these provisions arouses in one's mind a
question as to their· constitutionality. Fortunately we have the
studies of several learned Ia-wyers to rely upon. In the House, the
Constitutionality of the law Was so ·much doubted by some members that a resolution was actually introduced proposing an amendment to the Constitution "extending the power to regulate and control production, conservation, and distribution of food."as Representative Fess of Ohio, who is a well-read man in both.our political
and constitutional history expressed a belief that it was not only
constitutional, l>ut that it ought to be even stronger, and could be
so constitutionally." On the other hand Sella.tor Reed held vehemently that the legislati~ was unconstitutiQnal on general grounds
• Ibid. Pp. 276-g7.

•House Joint Resolution. 107 Concrealonal llecord •355·
" Concraaional Record, Pqe •325-
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because it created a Dictator, something foreign• to our Constitution
and to our republican ideals.15 He also protested specifically against
Section five of the Act as contrary to the Fourth Amendment which
guarantees the people against unwarrantable .searches and seizures."
Representative Lenroot claimed that the law delegated to the President legislative power.11 Others who found flaws were Senators
Gore, Gallinger, and Penrose, and Representative Young.
In all six objection,s seem to have been offered :-11
I. That there are sections contrary to the due process and just
compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment.11
II. That self-incrimination is compelled contrary to the Fifth
Amendment.•0
III. That the law auth~rizes unreasonable searches and seizures
contrary to the Fourth Amendtpent.' 1
IV. That the law provides for lhe expenditure of public funds
for private purposes."
V. That it delegates legislative power to the exccutive.0
VI. That it infringes upon the police power of the States."
'i'he defenders of the bill included not only those· like Senators
. Knox and Nelson and Representatives Lever, Caraway, and Fess,
who, as quoted above, thought the law vitally necessary and therefore constitutional; but others like Representatives Anderson and
. Overmyer \\'ho tried to produce proof in favor of each contested
feature." In support of their contentions they cited various Supreme Court decisions, and bad printed in the Record briefs prepared by capable lawyers." From authorities outside Congress we
receive further evidence that the law is valid.61 From these various
sources vie are· able to get considerable data in refutation of the
various objections.
·
l,et us consider them in the reverse order.
• Consresaional Record, Pase 3893·4; 4096.
• Consresaional Record, Pase 3895.
• Conpuiional Record, Pase 426o.
•Ginn in brief, Concraaonal Record, 4130.
• ArUes under Secs. 7, 8, and 13.
• ArUes under Sec. 6.
cs An.es under Sec. 6.
•Arises under Sec8. 9, 10, 1.a, and 21.
•An.es under Sec8. s·16 inc!uaiTe.
.. Tllia is fJUed upon tbe cbaracter of tbe bm as a whole. ·
• Consraaional Record Pp. 4i13 ff; 4us ff; 4239 ff.
.• • Consrealonal Record 4ooS ff; 4127 ff.
• C. Thorne in Annala of American Academy, NOY. 1917; Wu Enerclopedia.
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VI. In McCulloch v. Maryland1 Chief Justice Milsll~ said:"Thc sound COIJstruction of the Consti.tution must allow to
the national legislature that discretion with ~ct to the
. m.eans by which the powers it confers .arc _to be carried into
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high
duties· assigned to it, in the manner ~t ~eficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the Constitution and all means which are appropriate.
which ·are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are constitutiqnal.""
Is not the end of this law as expressed in its preamble-"the national security and defcnse,"-lcgitimate? Is it not a proper exercise of the war powers? "Is there such a relation between the conservation and regulation of the food supply and the conduct of the
war as will make these purposes necessl(ry or appropriate to the
.conduct of the war?"" This connection is obvious claimed Representative Anderson in answering· the above question, when one investigates conditions and comes to realize'° (I) that if the allies
were wholly cut off from American f~ supplies for thirty days,.
peace would be ahnost inevitable ;'1 (2) unchecked access would
mean a dangerous shortage ·in 'eight months; (3) abnormally high
prices might check consumption but would.also cause social upheavals which would hinder the prosecution of the~; (4) every Eui:opean nation has had to take steps ~ that direction.•~ Since this
is the case the producers and distributors of food carry on a busillCSS which in time of war is very much "affected with a public
-interest." The Suprenie Court has said that "a -bttsiness, by circum'Stances and its nature, may rise from priwtc to be of public concern. and be subcjct, in consequence to governmental regulation.''"
It would, then, seem that because -of the necessity whfch gave birth
10 the law and in the. light of the opinions of jurists and statesmen,
1hc law, in so far as police power is concerned, is oonstitutional.
V. The issue a.• ~o the delegation of legislative power arises in
two connections, both of which should offer little diffiCulty. The
•Cited by Cdq. Coqradonal Record 41a8.
•Jtep. Aadenon Conpaslonal Record 411.f.
•Ibid.
•Note tile 1,100,000 tom of foodstuf& lhipped ciurlns Karcla; TJiU Is equhaJeiit to
Olle pound per day per ~ ha Britain and France.
.
•Coacramoaat Record 411.-s; Tlaonle in Anaata of Aaericu ~Pp. ssS-7.
• Gna. ..41Hne, lru. Co. T. Lniil •33 U. S. 311t, 411. .AJ. dted ha War ~
-pedla.
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President is empowered to raise ~ tariff duties on wheat in a cer-

tain. tontingency. He is empowered to isSue licenses and prescribe
ttgUlations at his discretion. The first power is clearly constitutional
in the light of many dedsions of the courts in reP,Jd to ''contingency" legislation. T~e Supreme Court, for example, has sustained.
an act authorizing the President upon a given contingency, to suspend the provisions of .a tariff law relating to the free importation
of certain articles." The power to i~ue li~ses falls into the same
class. The. ·rule which the President is to follow is laid down.
"Congress does not autho~ the President to create any crUm: nor
to apply or withhold punishment {or any crime. ~ * * The crime and
the punishment th~r_efor are to be determined by facts, circwnstanccs, and conditi~ descn"bed in the bill as they, respectively,
arise.'111
.
·
IV. The purpose of this act is, as bas been shown, essentially and
entirely public. ~tever expenditures- are ·made, are ·made from ·
funds appropriated by the J:\ct, in furtherance of, and in ways designated in the Act. Whatever benefit may result to the wheat _growet' from the establishment of a minimum price is ~erely incidental
to the furtherance· of a purpose national in its scope and public in
its nature.
·
III. By Section 7 of th~ Law in question, suN>lics hoarded contrary to this. act may be seized· ~d sold. ·The o\vner has an equitable
right to the proceeds. Only the places of business of licensees are
to be entered and searched. This certainly is not unwarranted since
it is part of the agreement ~der which the license is given. The
supplies seized as a result of such searches have been held contrary
to a la\'!. whkh the owner has personally. agreed to. Certainly, then,
the .seizure is not unwarranted.
·
·
. ii. It is held that the fact that the President can require licensees
to submit reports under oath involves self-incrimination contrary
to the Fifth AmendD:icnt. This contention cannot be taken seriously. It would be an anomalous situation to have the goveniment issue licenses and then J>e unable to use such an appropriate means of
seeing that th~ conditions of the grant of the li~se are observed.
Anyhow ''this constitutional guaranty applies only to natural persons. Corporations, and thejr officers as such, may be compelled
to furnisli any information relating to the corporate business. wheth- .
er self-incriminatory or not, which is required by Congress.H "Any
11

Jlu6Mll PkU I: Co. "'· Clerlr 143 'U. S. 6.fp.

•Consr-ioml Record, Pqe 4132.,

• CoqrealonaJ llecord, Pqe 4131, !Sued· upon

wa-. .,._ u; s.

ui · u.

s.
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natural person, notwithstanding the constitutional provision may be
comj>clled to give self-incriminating evidence, if there bas been
granted to him immunity from prosecution, on account of such evi-·
dence, as broad as the c0nstitutional protection.'"., The rights which
lk,..nsees exercise are similar to those enjoyed by corporations.special legal rights, and as such can logically be treated in the same
way.
· I. The idea that there will be a talcing of property without just
compensation appears to be wi~out sound basis. When hoarded
necessaries are seized, they are sold publicly on the market and the
hoarder receives the net proceeds. Surely that is just compensation. When the President fixes rates and charges to which licensees
must conform, he merely follows a principle which is invoked by
every State in the Union in its treatment of businesses "affected
with a public interest" and which is applied by the United States
Government to interstate carriers. The slight resulting infringements to private rights are valid ·in view of the underlying public
interest.
In all these cases where property, or punishment is involved, the
person affected can appeal to the courts for the protection of hiscon~titutional rights and can thus require that a law which we believe to be constitutional on its face be enforced constitutionally.
As we have noted the President is given power in the case of food
to create any agency and to license dealers. These are in practice
the essential features. No sooner had the President signed the bill
than he carried out a decision already formed and appointed Mr.
Hoover Food Administrator conferring upon him the bulk of the
powers granted to the executive by the Act.'111 Mr. Hoover planned
a thoroughly integrated administrative system. For each· State a
State Food Administrator was appointed by Mr. Hoover, with the
approval of the President.11 He is the chairman of a State Food
Committee and is the executive representative of the Food Administration.
This State committee selects for each county
and large town a local committee, and· a local administrator who is responsible to the State administrator. These
local committees are of course also chosen subject to the approval of
the President, but in practice the. State Committee's choice is not
even pa.:;sed upon by him, unless some serious objections are in
• Coqreuional Record. 4131. Baled upon Cowu'l""'" "· H;Jclicocll 142 U. S. 547
and BrOWfJ T. Wlllbr 161 U. S .591.
• <Mliclal Bulletin 73; 1.
•See Of5cial Bulletin t7: a-Cue cited.
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rare· instances brought to bis attentioii.'° It is through these local
administrators, and through special agents that the work of ·the administration is carried on. They possess little discretionary power.
The State Administrators possess some discretionary powers, but
as a rule only ministerial powers. This is due to the fact that food
control must be essentially ccntraliZed and there· cim logically be
very little variation from general plans.11
The work of the Food Administration has been one largely of
propaganda. Food pledge cards were widely circulated and signed.ea
Bulletins were issued continually and distributed, or posted. "Fourminute speakers" acted under the general direction of the local
administrators.es National at;sociations of producers or manufacturers were called to meet with the Federal Food Administrator. and
then were urged to voluntarily agree to some form of co-operation
with the government." Meatless and wheatless days were instituted,
which in private homes depended for their effectiveness not upon
any legal sanction but upon the patriotism of the individual.
But the Administrator did not confine himself to sucli a policy.
What works with individuals does not apply to corporations, which
are largely Unaffected by patriotic appeals. Thus the : .>wer of licensing granted to the President was utilized. The Department of
Agriculture, under the powers newly given to it, undertook a nationwide inventory, and upon the basis of their deductions, Mr: Hoover
formulated his plans for conservation and for an equitable distribution throughout the. -coming year.115 The first step was to license
the handling of wheat and rye and the manufacture of products
derived from wheat and rye.· Exception was made of small millers,
and of farmers and farmers' co-operative societies.11 A proclamation to this effect was _made on August 14. 1917, and all persons affected were thereby notified that on and after September 1, a failure to take out a license or to observe the regulations would be ptlnished by the appropriate penalties prescribed in the Law.. Later,
importers, manu,facturers, and refiners of sugar, sugar syrups, and
molasses were similarly made to take out licenses.11 By a third
proclamation license5 were required for the importation, manufacture, storage, and distribution of specified neccssiti~, except in
• See copies of Literary Disest for months of October 15117 to Karch 15118.
•This point was much emphuized in Conirea
a Officisl Bulletin 145; 1. 146;3•
. •Official Bulletin 145; 8.
" See Sec. .z Chap. 53 United States Statutes 15117.-Aho Q!idat Bulletin 105; ._
tos; 7. 113; 1. uo; 6. etc.
• Official Bulletin 88; 4. Plan outlined for imentory.
•Proclamation No. 13851.
er Proclamation 0£ Sept. 7, 15117.
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cases."

specified·
Under further proclamations bakers who used a
certain amount of flour daily were licensed:• the arsenic industry
was licensed ;T0 the ammonia industry was licen..o;ed ;11 the alcoholic
content of malt liquor was limited to three per cent ;T1 businesses
connected with certain specified feeds and. foods were licensed ;1 a
licenses for all bakers of bread, hotels, and restaurants were required ;H guaranteed prices for wheat delivered at different places.
throughout the country were established. The punishments for violation of the conditions of the license have so far been light. Restaurants-bav~ _been required to close for from one to thirty days;
storage house5 were ordered to sell produce at once in some cases;
in a few cases licenses have been refused or revoked. The regulations established are essentially of an emergency character and hence
n~ not be discussed in detail. For example in February, dealers
were forbidden temporarily to handle freshly killed poultry. The
purpose was to prevent any further egg shortage.
In most of these cases it is the big dealer, the one whose .business
exceeds $100,000 annually who is affected. But through him the
small dealer is reached. If a small.deal~r charges exhorbitant rates,
or hoards, the wholesaler is simply ordered- not to supply him Unless he comes to time. The effectiveness of this legislation in producing the ends desired I shall describe later.
In regard to fuel the Law gave the President the power not only
to ·create an agency for the enforcC;ment of his proclamations and
orders, but also the power to establish maximum p,rices for coal. Mr.
Harry Garfield was appointed Administrator. He modelled his establishment . after that of the Food Administrator, with State and
lQCal administrators similarly chosen. The powers of the local administrators are somewhat more discretionary than those of the food
administrators. For instance they were given the power to divert
coal to places where it was most needed. The State Administrators
were to handle the coal problems in their respective States and were
to supervise the enforcement of the various orders of the Federal
Administrator by the local ·committees and administrators.11 The
fuel administrator bad difficult problems to solve. Strikes through·out the central and south-w~teni states had to be settled. Prices
•Proclamation 9f Oct. S. 1917.
• Proclamation of NOY. 7• 1917.
"Proclamation of NOY. 15, 1917.
ft Proclamation of Jan. 3, 1918.
a Proclamation of Dec. S. 1917.
a Proclamation of Jan. 10, 1918.
H Proclamation of Jan. 30, 1918.
• Official Bulletin 123; 1.
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had to be kept down and yet left high enough to keep most of the
margitµll mines running. Cars had to be supplied regularly at the
mines. Shortages locally or generally required prompt attention.
Railway congestion or severe weather caused complications. With
all these factors in the problem confronting it, the fuel administration enjoyed for several months a rather stormy career. Priority
orders on the railroads caused such terrible confusion and such
shortages of coal in the centers of population, the railroads had to
be taken over by the government in the latter part of December,
1917.11 Electric lighting had to be curtailed to save coal for domestic use, aµd finally a drastic order was issued by Dr. Garfield
establishing the famous heatle~s holidays. For five days straight
in the latter part of January, 1918, no industries except specially
named establishments were to use coal except to keep pipes and
materials from freezing. But with all this~ though considerable suffering was caused, this suffering was scattered throughout the various strata of society instead of being confined to the more improvident.
This experience taught the fuel administration a lesson. A scheme
was worked out for a zonal distribution of coal during the present
winter.77 This scheme was very elaborate but in substance, the
amount of coal needed for the coming year was estimated from a
study of statistical reports ; and arrangements were to be made for
the distribution of this _coal with the least possible transportation.
Also, through coal dealers, the individual requirement was ascertained and satisfied in part during the summer, thus "getting a start
on" winter deliveries.
The food administration was singularly free from conflicting
state, or municipal action. With a few exceptions, as in New York
where a law supplementing the Federal law was adopted,1 1 the states
have icft it to the United States entirely.
The fuel administration has not been quite so fortunate. . Local
officials threatened..-at various times to seize coal to supply homes.
In December, 1917. in the midst of a series of local coal shortages,
Governor Co"C of Ohio inter£ered, but stopped when requested by
the Federal Fud Administrator "that the State authority be not permitted to interfere with the action of the United Sates Fncl Administration. " 11
,. Proclamation of Dec. 26, 1917.-Done under authority of Sec. 1 Chap. 410. United
St:ites Statutes 1916. Page 645.
n Official Bulletin 265; 8-15.
n Ne"! York Tirrles .At1g. 25, J918. 3; l•. Aug. 30, 10; II.
:o Official B'"ulleiin i"83; 2.
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After considering the nature and extent of the control exercised,
the question arises-"Has it proved successful?,.
As for ·food control we a:re confident that it has. Little hostility
to the operations of Mr. Hoover has developed, and editorial opinion
voices generally the popular confidence. 'l'he purpose had bec:n to
meet the Allied food needs; to place the burden of conservation upon
all; to keep manipulators from profiting at the expense of the consumer and producer because of the national calamity. A few dissenting opinions may still be heard. Senator Reed, for example,
remains obdurate. He accuses the food administration of corruption and waste. The" "dollar-a-year"
he says, are there to
serve their own interests.11° Commission merchants also fail to see
the value of "Hooverism." One=of them testified that in March,
1918, the domestic meat demand had decreased thirty per cent and
that unless feeders could be assured of an open market and unre.stricted demand farmers and stock raisers would stop production.81
Certainly consumption was decreased, and prices were kept down
so much that the food administration was able to abolish meatless
days and to advocate a greater use of meat in place of wheat l Another commission merchant at the packers'. investigation said he believed the people were losing confidence in Mr. Hoover.81 Where
he drew his deductions from, except from hiS own dislike of "Hooverism", is a puzzle. The general attitude of the public toward Mr.
Hoover at that time is expressed in the following words :-'·He has
succeeded in a surprising degree in the tremendously intricate task
of controlling the distribution, retail price, and consumption o{ food
products."o3
in the past six months no new legislation of importance touching
food and fuel control has been· enacted, and now with the war ended further "war" legislation along these lines is improbable. More
than ever before the Food Administration is counted a success. Few
persons have viewed with complacency the "fifty-fifty" order, requiring the purchase along with wheat of an equal quantity of substitutes and requiring bakers to use as much of substitutes as of
wheat in their products. The rcstrictiqns placed upon the use of
sugar found much disfavor.-seldom amounting to opposition or
attempted evasion -yet the· amount allowed was large enough to
satisfy the ordinary requirements of most people. (ln fact the chief
objections were to the amount of red tape involved.) But these

men,
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have been the only orders affecting the consuming public. All other
restrictions have been merely suggested or requested as patrfotic
acts on the part of the individual.
Various other restrictions have been placed at times upon the
manufacturers and distributors of food and fuel products. Restaurants have been closed and penalized for profiteering; bakers
have been fined for the benefit of the Red Cross. The manufacture
of intoxicating liquors has gradually been restricted until, beginning
Dec. Ist, 1918, it has been entirely forbidden. Thus as a side-pro- ·
duct of Food-Control the cause of national prohibition has been materially advanced.
Of course prices have advanced. The power to regulate prices
was not given in a direct fonn to-the Food Administration, and ·even
if it had been given, the great rise during the ~ year in the prices
of other commodities, along with greatly increased wages, made it
impossible to maintain a pre-war level in the price ·of food-stuffs.
Profiteering however has been made more difficult for the dealers
in foods than for almost any other class of traders. Pitiless publicity and a watchful, criticizing public nave made the position of the
profiteer unenviable.
.
With food control successfully conducted within the country so
that vast supplies could be shipped to Europe, Mr. Hoover went to
Eµrope in August to c<>nfer with the various food dictators of ·the
Allied nations and so to formulate a plan for equitable distribution.
By virtue of his control of our surplus when all other nations were
experiencing a .shortage, Mr. Hoover had become to all purposes
the food controller of the world. Through enforced restrictions and
an effective propaganda the. United States had made available such
a surplus of food that the needs of the peoples of the Allied nations
were satisfied to that extent that hunger did not weaken their morale in the dark days of the past spring and siunmer. while increased
rations were made possible in the fall. Moreover because waste
has been so largely eliminated, consumption restricted, and production increased we as individual consumers now find ourselves confronted by no enforced restrictions, while Mr. Hoover is once more
in Europe surveying the situation and working out a plan whereby
food may be supplied to our small liberated allies, to the freed nationalities of Austria-Hungary, and even-, if fou~d necessary in
order to stay the spread of anarchy,-to the people of Ge~y.
And an effort is to be made to relieve those ten millions of Russians
who seem fore--doomed to starvation unless some means is found
for distributing the surplus of-the Ukraine ~d other S~uthem ·provinces throughout the once great empire.
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The success of food control in war time now gives rise to the
desirability o( its contintll1.tion in times of peace. If the neutral nations of Europe fotind it not only desirable but necessary, it is not
impossible that the United States may feel inclined to adopt a similar policy. The existence of such great agencies as the packing
companies, constituting according to the best evidence submitted
before Congressional Investigating committees a practical monopoly in control of vital necessities of life, gives occasion to a desire
for greater governmental activity than was usual before the ·war.
The Supreme Court has upheld State laws regulating charges· for
the use of grain elevators because of the connection between wheat
and the public interest. It is most probable, in view of the tendency
of the courts and of legal and political authorities generally to take
the position that there is a National Police Power when the State
Police Power is ineffective in practice, that United States laws giv- ·
ing the· Federal Government greater control nver food-producing
and distributing agencies would be upheld by the Courts, It is not
a great step from a "Pure Food Act" or from a "Bone Dry I.aw"
to a permanent law designed to prevent profiteering. It is not Socialism to enforce fairness. upon those who control the most vital of
necessities and yet never allow scruples _to interfere with their seizure of the last possible penny.
. The success of fuel control was long in doubt, but now seems
assured. State and focal ·administrators used their discretionary
authority to prevent excessive domestic suffering, though non-essential _industries were often seriously affected. Excessive use of priority orders hindered transportation and a serious shortage of cars
prevailed for months. It-is probable that the first coal prices were
· too low to keep the marginal mines running and so production decreased but it is safe to say that with adequate transportation facilities,_ difficulties would not have developed ·Added to this, the severest winter in a generation complicated matters. As a result we had
the notorious "heatless holidays." The order establishing these was
bitterly assailed in Congress and in the Press. It was a "Wild experiment of economic lunacy worthy of a Bolshevik Government.
***The ordet itself is a confession of incompetency."51 This is
the New York World's.opinion .. The New York Tribune said that
"Dr. Garfield' is in a phl1ic ·and acts in a headlong manner."3~ Almost every paper predicted an industrial disaster and universal suffering among:_ laborers. Some di~at~ up·on the comfort given to the
"Cited in LitelU)' Digest Jan. a6, 1918. P. 6.
•.Ibid.
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enemy. Individuals said that it would do "infinite hann here and
abroad";" that "this is the culminating atrocity in a series of cririles
against the nation".n A conservative journal proclaimed that "We
have had enough of priee fixing. It bas been a blunder from the.
start. Let cotton raisers, coal and fuel producer$, • * • be stimulated
to secure the greatest production at the highest prices."" The same
paper says again, "How Gemiany must gld'at over the coal panic
in the United States, the culminating achievement of red tai;>e I""
Not the mines nor the railroads are to be blamed! Then we hear
Senator Knox asserting that "A million German soldiers turned
loose in the United States could not work the havoc 'this fool order
will treate."' 0 And Senator Sherman- echoed him-''There was
never: a more flagrant lack of knowledge on the part of a government official than Mr. Garfield's order shows."11
Such hasty prophesies were soon seen to be iinscund. Dr. Garfield had acted slowly as is shown by the fact that he waited so long
before acting. President Wilson backed him up. Garfield's'statement explaining the order is interesting:"This is war. VVhatever the cost, we must pay it, so that
in the face of the enemy there can never be the reproach
that we held back from doing our full share. . Those s'1ips,
laden with our supplies of food for men and food for guns
must ha,ve coal and put to sea."11
A writer has said "The world has got to be fed or it will soon tire of
hearing the words, Liberty, Democracy, and Ideals."11 These ships
had lain long in New York Harbor. The needs of the allies were
great; a crisis was liy no means remote. The question is asked peJ'.linently ;· what would have happened to us withO\lt it~ The railroads had to be cleared and the ships started. If this could be done,
all would be well. And this in fact was done. The "heatless Monday" program was soon unnecessary. The effect on the nation was
almost insignificant. And yet only two months after this.order, the
Allies found it necessary to utilize every resource in order to check
"ke on-rushing foe. ·The United States had its part to play;, and to
•Ibid. P. 7.-Ex·Atton1CJ-Gcn. Wicbnllam.
•Ibid. G. P. GouJd.
• Lealie't Feb. 9, s918. P. sl6.
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play that part every ton o~ shipping was required. The ships that
were in New York harbor.in Janq_ary laden with food and munitions
reached Europe none too soon and when the Germans attacked,
those ships had returned or were returning for more supplies and
for men. The Allies were playing for time and every shipment
counted heavily.
'fhrough its power of regulating prices the Fuel Admiriistration
has kept down prices during the war so far as the necessity of higher wages to the mineworkers has allowed. And this is one of the
big points in government control,-it is fairly probable that if the
Government had let the coal business alone, factories and office
buildings would not have had to shut down; but it is also probable
that prices would have been intolerable and that the sufferings of
the poor would have been pitiable. The application of the zonal
system has both aided the railroads in solving their traffic problem
and has kept all districts sufficiently provided. The draft, the influenza, peace celebrations, et cetera have tended to curtail production ;
. but the stimulus of bonuses and higher wages, and a decreased use
of liquor in the mining areas have combined to offset this and. k~cp
production at an almost normal rate. With the demobilization of the
men in the camps the labor problem at the mines will be solved and
little further trouble need be expected. Fuel control does not have
the international importance that appertains. to. food control and
hence its continuance-is not SO" vital. In fact the Fuel Administration is making all preparations for winding up its affairs.
~ood and fuel control are only two of those phases of the larger
problems of Government control- of big business that concern all
citizens. The war time problem of food-control affected both big
and little business nien-it affected producer, distributor and consumer. As a· peace-time program it would tnvoive· mainly Government regulation. Tt would mean that the United States Government
would asstun~· the power of enacting and administering laws in regard to price-raising by agreement, to exact weights and measures,
to P'1rity, et cetera that are now administered by the states. In regard to fuel it might well result in.government operation and even
ownership if a growing searcity should bring about a complete adoption of the conservation program of such progressives as Gifford
Pinchot.
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